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Abstract: 
This article explores conceptual frameworks for understanding Korea’s contemporary cultural policy 
by looking into the historical transformation of the culture-state-market relations in the country. It 
argues that Korea has become ‘a new kind of patron state’, which emulates the existing patron states 
in the West firmly within the statist framework and ambitiously renders government-led growth of 
cultural industries (and the Korean Wave) as a new responsibility of the state. The formation of 
Korea’s new patron state has been driven by a ‘parallel movement’ consisting of democracy and the 
market economy, which has defined the political and socio-economic trajectory of Korean society 
itself since the 1990s. Democracy has been articulated in cultural policy as cultural freedom, cultural 
enjoyment and the arm’s length principle; meanwhile, the market economy of culture has been 
facilitated by a ‘dynamic push’ of the state. After discussing the parallel movement, the article points 
out the tension, ambiguity and contradiction entailed in cultural policy of the new patron state.  
 




In recent years, South Korea’s energetic cultural policy, often in connection to the global success of 
its pop culture (the ‘Korean Wave’ phenomenon), has sparked much attention of international media 
and research communities. The publication of this special issue is a clear indicator of the increasing 
scholarly inquiry into the policy and the significance of such inquiry in engendering new 
perspectives of culture-state relationship and internationalising this academic field. The existing 
literature provides useful accounts of the policy, especially its historical evolution and concerns with 
cultural identity, the persistence of the strong government, and the development of sub-policies such 
as arts funding, nation branding and multicultural policy (Hong 2014; H.-K Lee 2012, 2018; Yim 
2002; Yuk 2016). In addition, there are commentaries on urban cultural policy, cultural diplomacy 
and cultural labour in the country. Another set of literature focuses on the Korean government and its 
agencies’ active support for cultural industries and the Korean Wave (Chung 2012; Jin 2014, 2016; C. 
Kim 2017; Y. Kim 2013; Kwon and Kim 2014; Otmazgin 2011; also see Lee 2018: Chapters 5 and 
6).  
While their themes vary, the above writings shed light on the specificity of Korean cultural 
policy, which is difficult to fully comprehend within the existing, West-centric analytical 
frameworks. For example, the Korean state’s democratic but remarkably hands-on approach to the 
arts and cultural industries is hard to make sense of from the views that see culture, state and market 
as competing discourses that are mutually exclusive (McGuigan 2004), cultural policy as an 
overlapping zone where negotiations take place between (equally powerful) fields of culture and 
politics/economy (Vestheim 2012), institutional autonomy as a dominant framework of cultural 
policy (Blomgren 2012) and cultural policy narrowly defined as public policy on the arts and 
heritage (Mulcahy 2006: 320-321). Similarly, the Korean state’s ever-increasing cultural investment 
poses a challenge to the prevailing idea that cultural policy today is increasingly neoliberal in the 
sense that the state gives way to the market and public subsidy is replaced by private funding such as 
business sponsorship (McGuigan 2004, 2015).  
Hence, this article intends to explore conceptual frameworks for understanding Korea’s 
contemporary cultural policy by looking into the historical transformation of culture-state-market 
relations in the country. The transformation has been driven by a ‘parallel movement’ consisting of 
democratisation and the expansion of a market economy, which have determined the political and 
socio-economic trajectory of Korean society itself since the 1990s. The article argues that Korea has 
become ‘a new kind of patron state’, which emulates the existing patron states in the West firmly 
within the statist framework and ambitiously renders the development of cultural economy as a new 
mission of the patron state. The following section will draw our attention to the importance of 
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conceptual articulation of ‘the state’ in discussing Korean cultural policy and raise issue with the 
analytical relevance of the notion developmental state, which is often referred to by the existing 
literature. Then, the next sections will explain how Korea has become a new patron state and 
elaborate the parallel movement behind its emergence and expansion. In particular, the focus is on 
the interpretations of democracy in cultural policy and the crucial roles played by the state in 
conditioning the market economy of culture. The conclusion will reflect on the limitations of the 
parallel development of cultural policy, especially the lack of coherent rationale and the inherent 
tension in the construct of a new patron state.  
 
Thinking about ‘the state’ in Korean cultural policy  
The existing literature on cultural policy does not look enthusiastic about discussing the state in 
depth, and this is particularly so when it comes to writings derived from Anglophone societies such 
as the United Kingdom and the United States. Seemingly, it not only indicates the commentators’ 
cherishment of cultural autonomy and self-organisation as a coordination mode of cultural policy, 
but also reflects the laissez-faire tradition in these societies. It is not uncommon that the state is 
mentioned with some suspicion and reluctance in terms of danger, failure, decline, subjugation to 
market and globalising forces, and instrumentalism (Bell and Oakley 2015; Gray 2007; 
Hesmondhalgh et al. 2015; Kammen 2000; McGuigan 2004). Such narratives of the state are also 
conscious of the broader discourses of welfare state crisis, privatisation, new public management, 
decentralisatino, neoliberalisation, globalisation and the hollowing out of the state (Held and 
McGrew 2004; Mann 1997; McGuigan 2015; Rhodes 1994; Stewart and Walsh 1992). Meanwhile, 
the accounts of cultural policy in countries such as Germany and France highlight the state protecting 
culture (as the totality of human creations and articulations and/or the bearer of national identity and 
expressions) and acting as a buffer against market and globalising forces while being put under the 
increasing threat of the latter (Loosely 2003; Wesner 2010).  
In contrast, commentators on Korean cultural policy point out the centrality of the state in 
supporting culture, growing its market economy and pursuing outward cultural globalisation. It is 
interesting to observe that the endeavours to conceptualise the state are more visible in writings on 
cultural industries and the Korean Wave rather than those about arts policy, which has been the 
traditional terrain of cultural policy studies. This implies that the main concern here is the role of the 
state vis-à-vis market forces. Looking into the government’s consistent investment in cultural 
businesses, cultural exports and nation branding, Jin (2006, 2014) concludes that the country’s 
neoliberal reform has not reversed the state-driven cultural policy and this clearly shows the power 
of nation state not diminishing even in the global age. Chung’s (2012) research on cultural industries 
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policy since the 1990s discusses its rise against the country’s political and economic shifts and its 
effectiveness in boosting cultural businesses. Thus, Kwon and Kim’s (2014) article in this journal 
suggests that investigating government policies is critical to understanding the Korean Waves. 
Meanwhile, I have problematised the dichotomist viewpoint that treats culture, the state and the 
market as mutually exclusive by finding cultural export to have become a state-mediated national 
project and the government to have played decisive roles in instituting an arm’s length arts council 
(H.-K. Lee 2012, 2013).  
Notably, many writers make sense of the state in Korean cultural (industries) policy from the 
perspective of ‘developmental state’ (or ‘developmentalism’), which was explored in studies of 
industrial policies and economic governance in East Asian societies such as Japan, Korea, Taiwan 
and Singapore (Amsden 1989; Öniş 1991; Woo-Cumings 1999; White 1988). The key point of this 
perspective is that the spectacular economic performance in these late capitalist economies was 
attributed to the state’s dynamic intervention in the market in the form of strategic planning, resource 
mobilisation and allocation, investment in prioritised industries, investment coordination, the 
protection of domestic industries and effective linkages to private sectors. Commentators regard the 
presence of the strong state in cultural investment in contemporary Korea as a continuation of the 
developmental state as Jin (2014:90) states, ‘[i]n the realm of culture, the developmental state is not 
dead’. This view is supported by Kwon and Kim’s (2014: 426) finding that ‘the Korean government 
continued to demonstrate its capability as a developmental state by competently orchestrating the 
industrial growth [in cultural industries]’. In the same vein, Otmazgin (2011) highlights the legacies 
of the developmental state in his analysis of Korean and Japanese cultural industries policies that 
apply an industrial policy approach to culture. Taking a further step, Chung (2012) attempts to 
update the notion of the developmental state by conceptualising contemporary Korea as a ‘neo-
developmental state’ wherein the key elements of developmentalism such as emphasis on economic 
growth and export have converged with concerns about social welfare and neoliberal agendas such as 
competition. Similarly, Kim (2016) in the context of Seoul Metropolitan Government’s cultural 
policy, comments on intersections between the developmental state and neoliberalism in 
contemporary Korea. 
However, the analytical relevance of the notion of ‘developmental state’ is debatable. First, 
active industrial policies and industrialisation in East Asian countries can be discussed and 
understood from the broad perspective of ‘the state’, its function and capacity, not necessarily the 
developmental state as a specific type of state. Indeed, Karl Polanyi’s (2001[1944]) seminal finding 
on the embeddedness of the market economy in England, which had been deemed as one of the most 
liberal societies, demonstrate that the emergence of the capitalist market economy itself was a 
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product of state actions. From this perspective, making and implementing an intense industrial policy 
in Korea, or other East Asian countries, was never a deviation from the roles the state could 
potentially play in facilitating the market economy and speeding up the time-rate of its development. 
Second, the above writers’ interpretation of ‘development’ is rather slippery: they use this term to 
refer to ‘state-led’ investment and support provision, not necessarily implying a transformation in the 
nation’s productive structure via growth-enhancing rather than market-enhancing economic 
governance especially in low income countries (Khan and Christiansen 2011). Deliberating over 
historical and political specificity of the actual operation of Korea’s developmental state from the 
1960s till the 1980s, too, encourages us to question the analytical relevance of this notion to 
contemporary Korea that has ‘already developed’, is now undergoing the process of post-
industrialisation, and has successfully advanced democratic political institutions that were seriously 
lacking during the period of industrialisation (Öniş 1991). Another criticism is that the notion weighs 
domestic industrial policy too heavily whilst the significance of geopolitical and historical factors is 
less acknowledged. For instance, the competition with the communist North and concerns with 
national security assisted the authoritarian regime in the South in soliciting national consensus on the 
state-led economic modernisation; and the South benefitted from the substantial geostrategic 
advantage in its economic relationship with Japan and the United States, two of its closest allies 
during the Cold War period (Cumings 1984; J.-y. Lee 2012; Öniş 1991: 117).  
In addition, we should pay attention to the ‘cultural formation’ of Korea’s developmental 
state (J.-y Lee 2012) created by the Park Chung Hee’s military authoritarian regime (1961 to 1979) 
and underpinned by his extremely ‘active’ cultural policy. The core of the policy was the tight nexus 
between culture, state and economy. Whereas culture gave imagined boundaries to Korea as a nation 
state (Anderson 2006; Yim 2002), the state set a discursive and moral framework where the meaning 
and purpose of culture were determined (H.-K. Lee 2018: Chapter 3). Culture – primarily as 
‘national culture’ that highlighted heritage, tradition and patriotism – was employed to build national 
identity and cultivate a sense of loyalty to the state. As a source of collective memory and righteous 
historical perspective and also as an antidote to Western values and ideas such as democracy, 
freedom and individualism, it would assist the nation’s (or the Park regime’s) political and economic 
survival. Koreans were mobilised through cultural programmes and campaigns advocating state 
agendas such as national unity, modernisation, anti-communism, industrialisation and reform of their 
way of life. In this way, they were disciplined to become an obedient citizenry and productive 
workforce who would willingly take part in the process of the nation’s industrialisation. Of course, 
this necessitated severe restriction on cultural freedom and statist co-option between the authoritarian 
government and the cultural sector.  
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Thus, it would not be easy to neatly dissociate Korean developmental state from its 
contentious cultural underpinnings. Moreover, defining Korean cultural policy today as 
‘developmental’ does not adequately recognise the policy’s significant historical transformation 
(democratisation). The other side of the coin is that the notion is potentially applicable to 
‘undemocratic’ cultural policy (e.g., in China) where the state leads the growth of the market 
economy of culture via very hands-on promotion of domestic cultural industries and their exports. In 
this case, the term developmental overlooks the problematic side of the policy, such as tight 
censorship, by highlighting the state’s dedicated leadership and commitment to the cultural sector.  
 
‘The new patron state’ and a parallel movement of cultural policy 
As also suggested elsewhere, contemporary Korea can be understood as a new patron state (Lee 
2018). ‘Patron state’ is a familiar idea for cultural policy researchers. Born in the context of Western 
Europe and North America in the post-war period (notably Cummings and Katz 1987), it has been 
broadly understood in terms of the state acting as a benevolent patron for culture and having an 
institutionalised cultural subsidy system whilst culture itself being kept distance from politics. At the 
core of this idea, there is co-existence of cultural freedom and state cultural intervention in the form 
of subsidy, which aims at cultural preservation, artistic excellence and public accessibility, although 
the existing patron states differ from one another in terms of specific roles assigned to the state, 
(de)centralisation of policy making and relationships between key actors in the policy network. In 
this sense, the remit of the patron state is distinguished from cultural patronage before the twentieth 
century, or state cultural promotion in less democratic societies today. The successful 
democratisation of Korea has helped it to become on par with the existing patron states in the West: 
the Korean state is a resourceful patron for the cultural sector; a coherent and robust cultural funding 
system has developed; and artists and cultural organisations enjoy freedom. The transformation 
involves the borrowing of ideas and institutions from the existing patron states; yet, this has occurred 
firmly within the statist framework where cultural policy is coordinated by the mode of ‘hierarchy’ 
as opposed to the modes of ‘market’ and ‘self-organisation’ (Jessop 1999, 2016). Furthermore, Korea 
has invented a new obligation of the patron state: giving comprehensive and systematic support to 
cultural industries and cultural export, and taking this as a national economic project.  
 The emergence and consolidation of a new kind of patron state in Korea have been driven by 
democracy and the market economy, the two forces of the ‘parallel movement’ that has shaped the 
path of the Korean society itself since the 1990s. Unlike the existing patron states in the West, Korea 
in the 1990s witnessed democratisation and neoliberalisation taking place concurrently. Both were 
legitimised as an alternative to the military authoritarian governance that lasted from Park Chung-
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Hee’s coup in 1961 until the restoration of the presidential election in 1987. Democratisation in 
Korea, part of the what Samuel Huntington (1993) calls ‘third wave democratisation’ in the late 
twentieth century, resulted in the fundamental transformation in terms of the sources of authority of 
the government, its purpose and the procedures for constituting it, especially presidential elections. 
This came with the increased civil liberty and freedom of expression, the arrival of civilian rule, and 
the rise of civil society, which eventually led to the consolidation of democracy, the process by 
which ‘democracy becomes so broadly and profoundly legitimate among its citizens that it is very 
unlikely to break down’ (Diamond 1994: 15). Importantly, this process was joined by the civilian 
Kim Young-Sam government’s (1993-1998) neoliberal reform of the nation’s economic governance. 
The reform enjoyed democratic credential as it was taken as a progressive endeavour of de-
statisation of business, finance and overall economic life of Korean society. Similarly, the liberal 
government (1998-2003) of Kim Dae-Jung who had been a well-respected leading figure in the 
nation’s democratic struggle in the past decades, ‘based on the legitimacy of the pro-democracy 
movement effectively mitigated people’s potential resistance to intensified neo-liberal reforms 
[under IMF’s heavy pressure] after the 1997 crisis’ (Lim and Jang 2006: 448). For President Kim 
Dae-Jung, democracy and the pursuit of market economy were a twin force that would rescue Korea 
out of the economic crisis and determine the nation’s path for the future. Cultural policy 
development aptly reflected this macro-level context.  
The arrival of democracy meant a substantial shrinking of the nation state as the central 
reference of cultural discourse in Korea: the prescriptive idea of ‘national culture’ was delegitimised 
and statist cultural campaigns were discontinued. More specifically, democracy in Korean cultural 
policy was understood mainly as ‘cultural freedom’, ‘cultural enjoyment’ and ‘arm’s length 
principle’. Meanwhile, we should consider the unevenness of neoliberal reform in Korea, which 
contrasts the sweeping effect of such a reform taking place in the United Kingdom, a heartland of 
neoliberal ideology. In Korea, the reform focused on economic governance, especially reforming the 
ownership structure and governance of conglomerates (‘chaebols’), internationalising finance and 
maximising the flexibility of labour market whilst cultural industries, along with information, 
technology and R&D industries, emerged as an infant industry deserving government investment. 
The popular discourse of knowledge economy, information society and post-industrial society served 
as a powerful buffer that kept these nascent industries away from neoliberal policies and justified 
state intervention. Against the backdrops of the urgent mission of ‘rebuilding of the nation state 
(gukgajaegeon)’ after the 1997 economic crisis, the post-industrial transition of Korea and the 
nation’s ambition to win intensifying global competition, the nexus between culture and the state 
began being reconfigured with an increasing emphasis on the former’s economic potential. 
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Across arts and cultural industries, Korean cultural policy has been dominated by the 
hierarchical mode of coordination that relies on top-down planning, resource mobilisation, 
investment, infrastructural provision, training and skills development and export support (Lee 2018: 
Chapter 1). The political and economic shifts since the 1990s have not altered the existing structure 
of cultural policy driven by the powerful central government and its executive agencies. The 
ministry’s budget, including several endowment funds under its purview, has increased consistently: 
126.8 billion won (0.4% of the government budget) in 1991 to 1,170.7 billion won (1.23%) in 2000 
(MCT 2005: 49). The growth continued: 2,874.6 billion won (0.95% of government budget) in 2009 
to 4,104.8 billion won (1.19%) in 2013 (MCST 2014: 74-75). Similarly, the ministry has expanded in 
terms of its size too: 316 staff members in 1990 to 646 in 2015.i This has coincided with the 
diversification of its focus from heritage and the arts to tourism, cultural industries, the Korean Wave 
and creative start-up businesses, each area of which has seen a proliferation of government initiatives 
and investment schemes. Although local authorities were given a degree of autonomy in the 1990s 
and have played an increasingly important role as cultural patrons,ii the overall landscape of cultural 
policy is still determined by the central government in terms is it discursive leadership in setting 
agendas and its capacity in developing key institutions for cultural policy, such as cultural funding 
agencies and investment programmes. The prevailing hierarchical mode of coordination can be 
compared with the modes of ‘market’ (contractual relations, competition and pursuit of private 
interests) and ‘self-organisation’ (collaboration and network among mutually dependent actors) 
(Jessop 1999, 2016). Both the democratic transition of cultural policy and the facilitation of market 
economy of culture have relied upon the mode of hierarchy that prefers state-led approaches as the 
following sections will demonstrate.  
 
Articulations of democracy in cultural policy 
The foremost fruit of democratisation of Korean cultural policy is the increased freedom of culture or 
freedom of expression. This can be seen as a negative liberty citizens are entitled vis-à-vis external 
compulsion of the state and other citizens, an essential condition of electoral democracy (Habermas 
1994), which was ardently called for by the vigorous democratic movement in the country. 
Achieving and normalising cultural freedom in this sense was a corollary of the dynamic interplays 
between the democratic movement, cultural activism, cultural consumerism as well as constructive 
responses of the government. First of all, the progressive arts movement and cultural activism, which 
prevailed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, seriously contested the existing coupling between culture 
and the state by resisting government control on arts, popular culture and journalism. Their pressure 
led the ex-general Roh Tae-Woo, the leader of the ruling conservative party who became an elected 
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president later, in June 1987 to assert that the government could not and should not control culture 
(Seo 1988). The state’s non-intervention in culture became a new normal in a decade although its 
influence on public broadcasting continued. It was the Roh government (1988-1993) that played 
decisive roles in democratically transforming Korean cultural policy in the period of transition from 
military to civilian rule. It liberalised publisher registration and loosened the censorship on theatre 
and film scripts (1988). It also lifted bans on public access to publications from communist countries 
including North Korea and artworks produced by those who defected to the North (1988). The 
constructive response of the government to the pro-unification agenda of the surging democratic 
movement resulted in the dilution of the statist and prescriptive understanding of ‘national culture’ 
and contributed to the eventual demise of this idea in cultural policy discourse in Korea.  
As of the mid-1990s, the pursuit of cultural freedom became a consumption project, wherein 
fans of popular culture called for more liberty and demanded the abolishment of cultural censorship 
(Lee 2018: Chapter 4; Sim 2006). Facing the rising discontent of artists and cultural consumers alike, 
the civilian Kim Young-Sam government (1993-1998) finally put an end to cultural censorship (on 
performance, film screening and recorded music) in 1996. This created an environment where 
cultural producers could freely create works that dealt with socially and politically sensitive themes 
and thus diversify the repertoire of cultural expressions in Korean society. The year 1999 was 
another key moment: the liberal Kim Dae-Jung government (1998-2003) radically revised the 
existing cultural laws and ambitiously enacted new ones (e.g., it revised Performance Act, replaced 
Motion Picture Act with Act on Motion Picture Promotion, and Recorded Music Act with Act on 
Recorded Music, Video and Games) with a firm intention to deregulate cultural production and 
distribution. Furthermore, the laws clearly indicated a shift from regulation to promotion that 
requires the state to plays bigger roles to encourage cultural production as opposed to leaving it to 
market forces. Through the above processes, cultural freedom, which was initially emerged as a 
political issue, became a pre-requisite of consumer society and a baseline of cultural promotion 
policy. In addition, the existence of varied stakeholders across public and private sectors explains 
why it has been strongly consolidated. In this regard, the recent scandal around the misconduct of the 
conservative president Park Geun-Hye (2013-2017) is quite telling. Her abuse of power included 
drafting a blacklist of ‘leftist’ artists and pressurising the cultural ministry and its agencies/affiliated 
organisations to exclude them from public funding (BBC News 2017). Yet, Park’s impeachment in 
March 2017, following a series of large-scale public demonstrations, unfailingly manifests Korean 
society’s robust support for cultural freedom and that Park’s attempt to restore the authoritarian state 
in cultural funding was an utter failure.   
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The second articulation of democracy in the context of Korean cultural policy is ‘cultural 
enjoyment (munhwahyangsu)’ that is translated to public access to and enjoyment of culture. This 
can be understood as a type of positive freedom: the state creates structures and programmes so that 
the public can easily enjoy cultural and arts activities regardless of their socio-economic 
circumstances and geographical locations. It was as early as the 1980s when policy makers began 
talking about cultural enjoyment and regularly conducting surveys on public cultural consumption.iii 
Still, they were preoccupied by promoting prescriptive ‘national culture’ and building large-scale 
cultural venues such as the Seoul Arts Center (1987), the National Museum of Modern and 
Contemporary Art (1986) and the National Gugak Center (1986) (ACK 2008a: 42). Then, the Roh 
Tae-Woo government’s conversion of the Ministry of Culture and Public Information to the 
‘Ministry of Culture’ in 1990 signalled the historic dissociation of cultural policy from public 
propaganda, a core component of the policy thus far. Under the strong leadership of the ‘culturalist’ 
minister, Lee Eo-Ryeong (1990-1991), the new ministry reoriented the policy towards cultural 
creation and public accessibility.  
Yet, the process was typically Korean – top-down and led by the cultural ministry, lacking 
deliberation on culture itself – its definition, legitimacy and value – among cultural producers, 
citizens and cultural bureaucrats. Without meaningful discussion, a quick consensus formed that 
culture (mainly professional arts), as intrinsically positive and beneficial to the public, should be 
brought closer to and be part of their everyday life. As such, cultural enjoyment was about culture 
seeking the people, rather than seeking of people’s culture. Having been already familiar with the 
Western discourse of ‘democratisation of culture’ (dissemination of professionally made culture) and 
‘cultural democracy’ (empowering people to choose their own cultural pursuit and legitimising their 
choice) (Evrard 1997; Mulcahy 2006), Korean policy makers comfortably equated cultural 
enjoyment to ‘democratisation of culture’.  
 
Table 1. A summary of cultural enjoyment programmes  
Period Main areas of cultural enjoyment policy 
(funded by Korean Culture & Arts Foundation and, later, Arts Council Korea) 
1980s 
 
National female writing competition 
Social and cultural education (including support for cultural club activities) 
Support for youth’s cultural enjoyment  
Touring of arts 
1990s Cultural enjoyment right of the disabled 
Cultural month and cultural day events 
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Cultural welfare (dissemination of culture) 
Cultural schools (cultural education programmes)  
Everyday culture 
National female writing competition 
Social and cultural education activities 
Support for youth’s cultural enjoyment (education, participation, festivals) 
Touring of arts 


















Arts participatory opportunities for children and youth 
Bringing arts to marginalised communities  
Cultural schools (cultural education programmes)  
Cultural welfare (cultural provision for the disabled, marginalised communities, 
childcare institutions, low-income urban communities and rural communities) 
Facilitating local culture  
National female writing competition 
Social and cultural education activities 
Touring of arts  
 
Cultural vouchers for marginalised communities 
Subsidised tickets 
Touring of culture   
Arts education programmes for the youth in marginalised communities 
Facilitating bottom-up cultural activities in maginalised communities 
Cultural diversity programmes  
Cultural programmes for the elderly  
and so on 
Source: ACK (2008b: 125-128, 204-210, 258-269) and MCST 2014 (91-119)  
 
As seen in Table 1, cultural enjoyment programmes have focused on offering performance 
tickets at subsidised prices, tours of theatres, dance and music performances and art exhibitions, 
bringing arts to marginalised communities and remote places, supporting activities organised by 
cultural clubs and so on (ACK 2008b; MCST 2014). As lottery money began feeding into arts 
funding in the mid-2000s, the agenda of cultural enjoyment gained more prominence. As of 2017, 
Arts Council Korea’s expenditure allocated to this is biggest among its spending on the four major 
categories of activities: cultural enjoyment (1,070 billion won); arts creation (453.8 billion won); 
regional arts (319.5 billion won); and encouragement of private donation and arts management 
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(315.9 billion won) (ACE 2017: 5-7). Although policy makers refer to the terms ‘cultural democracy’ 
and ‘prosumption’ to stress participatory components of cultural enjoyment programmes, this does 
not necessarily contest the latter’s dissemination-centric approach (ACK 2008b: 69). In this sense, 
cultural enjoyment is a matter of cultural policy – not cultural politics – that can be neatly managed 
by the government. One of the most recent development is the enactment of the Cultural Basic Law 
(2014) designed to promote Korean citizens’ ‘cultural right’, that is, their right to cultural enjoyment 
without discrimination based on sex, religion, race, generation, region, social class, economic status 
and physical conditions through feely creating culture and participating in cultural activities. Whilst 
the law is a clear signal showing Korean cultural policy’s aspiration for progressive envisioning of 
positive cultural freedom, we are yet to observe how the idea of cultural right and the law’s 
principles such as diversity, autonomy and creativity will be translated into concrete policy measures 
and whether this will bring some elements of cultural politics and society-wide deliberation on 
culture to cultural policy, which has rarely happened so far.  
Another key rendering of democracy in Korean cultural policy is arm’s length principle, 
under which autonomous councils act as a buffer between the government and the cultural sector. As 
a tenet of institutional autonomy of culture, this principle allows cultural funding to be made by 
cultural experts and practitioners by insulating them from intervention of the government as the 
paymaster (Blomgren 2012). It is worth noticing that the democratic credential of arm’s length 
principle is sometimes questioned in the existing patron states including the United Kingdom, the 
birth place of arts council, due to its deficiency of representation and participation of citizens (and 
arts communities) (Gray 2012).  Nevertheless, Korean policy makers expected it to trigger a kind of 
‘deliberative’ democracy (Gray 2012; Habermas 1994) through active communication, discussion 
and consensus formation among artists themselves, within structure of an arts council, for example, 
the council, sub-councils and the system of peer review. Especially, the arm’s length principle was 
thought to embody the three governing principles of the liberal Roh Moo-Hyun government’s (2003-
2008) – participation (participation of practitioners in policy making), sharing of power (between the 
government and the newly created arts council) and autonomy (insulating arts funding decision from 
politics). Modelled after arts councils in the United Kingdom and following the establishment of the 
Korean Film Council in 1999, Arts Council Korea was created in 2005.  
Nonetheless, there hardly was a replacement of ‘the state’ by ‘self-organisation’. The creation 
of the council was driven and guided by the cultural ministry that regarded ‘self-organisation’ as a 
more democratic mode of coordination of arts funding policy. As an enthusiastic advocate of the 
arms-length principle, the liberal Roh Moo-Hyun government strongly justified the arts council 
model and initiated relevant discussion. In particular, its balancing act between conservative and 
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progressive sections of the arts community and facilitation of a cross-sectoral agreement on the need 
for an arm’s length arts council, should be noted (H.-K. Lee 2012). The initial expectation was that 
the council, which was to be driven by consensus, trust, mutual understanding and collaboration 
between artists themselves, would institute self-organisation as a new mode of cultural policy 
making, which is neither market nor hierarchy (ACK 2008b; Jessop 1999; Powell 1990). However, 
the relationship between the arts council and the government thus far has been more complicated as 
the council works firmly ‘within’ the length of a short arm from the government and has been 
dependant on the latter’s support. The strong state has manifested itself in the form of the 
government’s habitually hands-on approach, increased monitoring of the council by various 
governmental bodies (which is a consequence of the rising audit culture) and key funding decisions 
made at the state level (e.g., the abolishment of the council’s existing endowment fund and bringing 
in lottery money) (H.-K. Lee 2012). In particular, the Act on the Management of Public Institutions 
(2007) seriously undermined the arm’s length principle by designating Arts Council Korea as a 
‘semi-public’ organisation. Clearly, British-style arm’s length public bodies hardly find their space in 
Korean cultural policy.  
The Park Geun-Hye scandal, especially the arts council’s implementation of the blacklist 
drafted by the presidential office, aptly shows how short the arm’s length actually can be. As noted, 
Park’s infringement of cultural freedom was a so extraordinary incident that would not easily recur 
in Korea where democracy has been firmly consolidated. Whilst criticising Park’s (failed) 
authoritarian approach is an easy thing to do, a more difficult task is to comprehend why Arts 
Council Korea run by professional artists, cultural experts and cultural administrators did not dare to 
resist it. What appears obvious here is the dominance of the hierarchy over self-organisation in the 
relationship between the government and the council and its internalisation by the council members 
and staff. Then, the question would be how the council can secure a decent length of arms within the 
given parameters and more progressively articulate its roles in promoting cultural freedom in both 
negative and positive senses as well as facilitating meaningful deliberation on arts policy. 
  
The market economy of culture  
Alongside democracy, the other constituent of the parallel movement of Korean cultural policy has 
been the market economy of culture. Before delving into this, it is useful to consider two 
interpretations of the market. The first one is an abstract construct of a self-regulating market: ‘the 
market’ in this sense is regarded as a system, rationality or coordination mode that organises 
economic activities. Highlighting individual liberty, private property rights, profit-seeking 
motivation, competition and free trade, this idea of market forms a core tenet of neoliberal ideology 
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(Harvey 2007). The other interpretation is ‘the markets’ in plural, which are historically, locally and 
sectorally specific and are shaped (regulated) by social relations and state policies. In this sense, 
neoliberalisation can be seen as making ‘regulated markets into a self-regulating market’ and 
embedding social relations in the economic system (Polanyi 2001[1949]: 60). The growth of a 
market economy of culture in Korea since the 1990s is a complicated phenomenon situated in the 
country’s neoliberal reform, where cultural industries have sought advantages in the unevenness of 
the reform and the rise of new economy discourses. Of significance, the rapid expansion of these 
industries is not something that happens naturally but has occurred under strong ‘push’ from the state.  
The Korean state’s endeavour to develop cultural industries, as an economic sector, via a 
comprehensive range of policy measures can be understood from the perspective of the 
‘entrepreneurial state’, the state that sets a vision for industrial development, has willingness and 
ability to take on risk, and facilitates innovations in the private sector (Mazzucato 2013). This 
perspective applies the Schumpeterian understanding of entrepreneurship to industrial and innovation 
policy of nation states (Schumpeter 1989[1949]). Korean policy makers believe that the role of the 
state should go beyond the traditional approach of the existing patron state to cultural industries – 
that is, addressing market failure and protecting local cultural production from global forces – to 
stimulate the growth of the industries by offering bold investments, inventing new methods of 
cultural financing, providing infrastructure and encouraging innovations in the private sector. The 
Korean state’s adoption of an entrepreneurial role is vindicated by the prevailing economic reasoning 
of culture and policy makers’ fascination with the possibility of the nation’s outward cultural 
globalisation (the Korean Wave). The following will discuss some of the key measures taken in this 
area, which eventually removes ‘cultural’ concerns from cultural industries policy.   
 First, if the Roh Tae-Woo government (1988-1993) transformed Korea from an authoritarian 
state to an emerging patron state, the Kim Dae-Jung government (1998-2003) set crucial legal and 
financial grounds for the rise of an entrepreneurial state in the nation’s cultural industries policy. 
Importantly, the cultural laws introduced and revised under Kim’s leadership – such as the 
Framework Act on the Promotion of Cultural Industries (1999), the Act on Motion Picture 
Promotion (1999), the Performance Act (revised in 1999), the Act on Recorded Music, Video and 
Games (1999) and the Framework Act on the Promotion of Cultural Industries (1999) – required the 
state (‘the state and local authorities’) to become an ‘entrepreneurial state’ in order to develop 
cultural industries, content industries or a specific cultural industry. This set a template for the 
following laws concerning cultural industries. What the state ‘ought to’ do, according to these laws, 
is very wide-ranging: including planning, promotion of production, supporting export, developing 
human resources, facilitating skills and technology development, providing infrastructure and so on 
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in the relevant cultural industries. As part of the policy package, the laws also stipulate that the state 
and local authorities ought to provide financial support for cultural industries. The Korean 
government’s impressive administrative and financial capacity allows these laws to be very quickly 
translated into actual policy measures in the areas mentioned above, generating a dense structure of 
state promotion of cultural industries.  
 Second, there has been a continuous increase in the cultural ministry’s spending on cultural 
industries. It was only 5.4 billion won (1.8% of the cultural ministry’s budget) in 1994 but it grew to 
100 billion won (11.7% of the ministry’s budget) in 1999 when the Kim Dae-Jung government was 
initiating a very hands-on policy in this area, including setting up a special fund for cultural 
industries investment. Unlike many of Western patron states such as the United Kingdom and France, 
the growth of the spending in Korea defied party politics. It continued regardless of changes of 
government between liberal and conservative to reach 500 billion won (19.6% of the ministry’s 
budget) in 2015 (MCST 2016). Another notable phenomenon is that the ministry has effectively 
leveraged private funding by inventing a new method of cultural financing: its investment in the 
cultural and film accounts of Motae Fund (fund of funds) under the purview of the Ministry of SMEs 
and Startups, feeds into public-private investment funds that are managed by professional fund 
managers and are dedicated to cultural, film and creative businesses of a small and medium size. 
According to the cultural ministry’s latest report, this way of cultural financing successfully raised 
private money so the total amount of public-private cultural investment was 2.3 times the 
government’s initial fund (MCST 2017). Between 2006 and 2016, 1,868.1 billion won was raised (74 
public-private investment funds) and was invested in 1,663 SME cultural businesses, mainly film, 
commercial performance and games (MCST 2017). In the case of film, the importance of this type of 
financing is very visible: the fund raised via the cultural and film accounts of the Motae Fund 
accounted for approximately 39.3% of the total production cost between 2010 and 2013 (Hyun 2014: 
4). The government has tried to invest in areas that are less attractive to private investors by 
committing some of public-private funds to certain areas such as micro companies and pre-/early 
production. Despite these efforts, the trend has still been that these funds prefer more lucrative areas 
such as popular film and games.  
Third, the roles of the Korea Creative Content Agency (KOCCA, 2001-) and the Korean Film 
Council (1999-) have been essential in delivering policy as these are executive agencies that make 
policy ‘really happen’. Although the film council was established as an autonomous arm’s length 
agency, it has functioned as an executive agency in the Korean state’s film investment. KOCCA’s 
remit is much wider, covering all areas of cultural industries from pop music, broadcasting, 
animation to character design. If the film council is positioned between cultural and industrial 
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policies, KOCCA has more confidently applied an industrial policy approach to cultural industries 
promotion: investment in development, production, distribution and marketing; export support; 
provision of market and legal information; hosting showcases; sending Korean producers to media, 
film and book markets abroad; and so forth. Via offering a wide range of export support from its 
inception, KOCCA and its overseas offices (United States, Europe, Japan, China, Indonesia and 
UAE) have actively rendered cultural globalisation as a much-needed and crucial opportunity for 
Korea’s cultural export, stimulating domestic cultural producers’ global ambition and helping their 
access to overseas markets.  
Fourth, state policy set am important context for the market economy of culture in Korea by 
turning culture into a ‘fictitious commodity’, which has ‘the form of a commodity (can be bought and 
sold) but is not actually produced in order to be sold’ (Jessop 2007: 118; Polanyi 2001[1949]: 
Chapter 6). It was the 2000s that the cultural ministry and its agencies initiated a bold discursive 
exercise deconstructing culture to sellable and flexible ‘content’. The term ‘content’ was adopted by 
KOCCA in 2001 (J-y. Lee 2012: 130) and was soon incorporated into the Framework Act on the 
Promotion of Cultural Industries, when the law was revised in 2003 and defined content as ‘data or 
information of symbol, text, voice, sound and screen image’. This term quickly gained currency and 
eventually replaced ‘culture’ in the discussion of cultural industries policy. ‘Content’ as a popular 
discourse highlighted the affinity and convergence between culture, software, information and digital 
technology (J.-y. Lee 2012: 130). It also understood culture – now as content – as digitally 
modifiable, mixable and able to be easily put into for-profit production of cultural goods and services. 
In the similar vein, the idea of ‘digital cultural archetype’, as a specific type of content, was invented 
and made popular in the 2000s. This term referred to a basic form or prototype that is a component of 
the cultural heritage and tradition of Korea, and its digitalisation was a main strand of KOCCA’s 
activities from 2002-2010: this agency aimed to identify cultural archetypes in Korean history and 
digitalise them to generate a huge pool of content (photos, pictures, texts, sound, moving images and 
other forms of data), which was to be used in the making of TV shows, films, games, comics and so 
on. In recent years, policy makers have ardently advocated the idea of ‘story’, a key input in the 
production of narrative-based cultural commodities. The ministry’s Plan for Story Industry 
Promotion (2015-2020) put all narrative-based cultural businesses in the new category of ‘story 
industry’ and aims to grow this industry to a size of 5 trillion won (approx. USD 4.59 billion) by 
2020 (MCST 2015).iv While a law on story industry promotion is still to be enacted, the ministry and 
KOCCA try to create an encouraging environment by organising annual story competitions, provide 
physical space and mentoring for story creators, offer financial investment options, and provide story 
creators with various supports in business planning, marketing and overseas pitching.  
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These efforts to commodify culture have been pushed further by the state-led creation of 
markets for trading cultural ideas and creative expressions. The cultural ministry and its agencies’ 
invention of markets for scenario, digital cultural archetype and story not only manifest the Korean 
government’s firm belief in active cultural industries policy. But it can also be taken as a rather 
extreme example reminding us that the market does not emerge naturally. The state-funded creation 
of those markets intended to fully commodify scenario, cultural archetype and story so they could be 
freely traded between creators and buyers. It was under the liberal Roh Moo-Hyun government 
(2003-2008) that the Korean Film Council launched the ‘Scenario Market’ (2005-) to radically 
transform the existing ways of production and distribution of film scenarios by creating a state-
sponsored and centralised online e-commerce site for scenario trade. KOCCA, too, ambitiously 
created an online marketplace (culturecontent.com) in 2005 for trading digital cultural archetypes. 
The latest arrival of a market of this kind is ‘Storyum’, a centralised online market for story trade, 
launched by the cultural ministry and KOCCA in 2016. These ‘markets’ are heavily supported by a 
comprehensive package of activities provided by the film council/KOCCA, including state-funded 
mentoring/development (for creators), an online review system, matching between story sellers and 
buyers, copyright protection (using DRM technologies) and a standard template of contract designed 
by the film council/KOCCA. Copyright protection is a crucial pre-condition for the commodification 
of cultural ideas and expressions and, hence, it forms a key function of the above online 
marketplaces.  
Yet, it is debatable if these state-created markets have been successful. Culturecontent.com 
failed to produce a notable amount of trade and, thus, has become a website that offers digitalised 
historical content to the public free of charge and to producers of educational materials for a minimal 
charge whilst ‘Storyum’ is too young to be evaluated. In the case of Scenario Market, the verdict is 
mixed. From its creation in 2005 to February 2018, approximately over 6,500 scripts have been 
registered for sale; however, only 180 scenarios were traded during this period, and not all of them 
were made into a film. This is quite a small number given the number of domestic films produced, 
for example 373 films in 2016 (KOFIC 2017: 14). In this sense, the actual role of this marketplace 
looks closer to being a hub where (potential) scriptwriters showcase their work and get feedback and 
mentoring. In a similar vein, a disappointing commercial performance is also seen in the operation of 
the public-private investment funds supported by the government’s Motae Fund. Despite some 
attention grabbing success of films funded in this way, many of the public-private investment funds 
hardly make profit. As of October 2017, the average earning rate of those funds was 0.97: the 
earning rate of 217 out of 477 projects invested was under 1.0 (this means that the spending was 
bigger than the earnings) and 27 projects did not generate any earnings at all (Yonhap News 2017). 
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One reason for their underperformance might be that the funds are banned from investing in projects 
of big media corporations and required to focus on SMEs, bearing higher risk. 
These cases are interesting examples showing the complicated – and even paradoxical – 
nature of Korea’s cultural industries policy. While having developed against the backdrop of the 
neoliberal economic reform, the policy demonstrates the government’s unreserved conviction that a 
dynamic push of the state is an essential condition for the growth of the cultural market economy. 
Yet, the broader and longer-term effect of the policy seems contentious. It makes things possible, 
which would not happen without state support, and can help cultural producers and businesses – 
especially those who are less resourced – more easily access finance, skills and market information. 
Yet the irony is that the stronger state intervention is, the more commodified Korea’s understanding 
of culture becomes.  
 
Conclusion 
Korean cultural policy since the 1990s has been a state project not a government project. It defies the 
Western style of party politics typically manifested by the left-wing government increasing cultural 
investment and the right-wing reducing it by funding cuts and privatisation. There were attempts to 
bring cultural policy under crude party politics (illustrated by the Park Geun-Hye’s scandal) (Lee 
2018: Chapter 4) but the overall commitment of the Korean state to culture is persistent and ever-
increasing. Similarly, there have been no notable shifts in policy discourse, policy structure or 
cultural budget in spite of changes of government between liberal (so-called leftist) and conservative 
(so-called right-wing) over the years. This article has proposed the idea of patron state to capture the 
democratic transformation of the policy and to highlight the coexistence of cultural freedom and state 
intervention. Korea as a new patron state pursues democracy and market economy robustly within 
the statist framework, which does not necessarily seek an overarching, unitary rationale of cultural 
policy. This process has been competently managed by the government but not without tension and 
contradiction. The lack of deliberation on culture itself means that the interpretations of democracy 
have rarely gone beyond the given framework of cultural policy, and the policy’s hierarchical mode 
is in inherent tension with its pursuit of arm’s length principle. Meanwhile, the assimilation of 
cultural industries policy to industrial policy puts economic boundaries on the nation’s cultural 
imaginations and engenders the possibility of the policy’s own exhaustion as a ‘cultural’ policy.  
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i The ministry’s 2015 Cultural Policy White Book (p. 48) notes that the newly born ‘cultural ministry’ had a total of 316 
staff members. Its ‘Munhwacheyukgwangwangbu jeongwonhyeonhwang (The current number of staff)’ shows a total of 
646 people are employed by the ministry as of September 2016. In addition, the document indicates that 2,094 people are 
employed by organisations affiliated with the ministry, such as the National Museum of Korea and the National Gugak 
Centre. 
 
ii In terms of cultural spending (spending on arts and culture; excluding tourism and sports), local authorities spent more 
(3,272.8 billion won) than the central government did (1,986.8 billion won) as of 2015 (data generated at KOSIS 
website). 
iii The cultural ministry and Korea Culture and Tourism Institute began regularly conducting surveys on Korean’s cultural 
enjoyment to understand the cultural life of Koreans (every 3 years since 1988 and every 2 years since 2006).   
iv Yet, its actual policy focuses on the creation of stories for film and drama, in the form of original prose, 10% of which 
is dedicated to dialogues that express and highlight main characters. 
